Hatred

Hatred is the condition in which a Prince loses the goodwill of the body of his subjects and becomes an object of detestation. It is not merely an emotional reaction but a political danger: once subjects hate their ruler, conspirators can expect popular approval rather than punishment, and every external difficulty may expose the weakness of the regime. The book therefore treats avoiding hatred as one of the central requirements of retaining power, even when a Prince must sometimes employ severity or accept other forms of infamy.

Definition and Sources

Hatred arises most readily when a Prince interferes with the property or the women of his subjects. These offenses touch possessions and honor, the interests that the mass of mankind guards most jealously. So long as neither property nor honor is violated, people generally remain content, and the Prince need chiefly restrain the ambition of a small number of powerful individuals. The danger changes once subjects believe that the ruler may seize what belongs to them or injure their households: resentment then becomes broad, personal, and difficult to contain.

The book distinguishes hatred from fear. A ruler may inspire fear without becoming hated, provided that punishment has a manifest cause or reasonable justification and that he abstains from confiscation and sexual violation. Fear is connected with the apprehension of punishment, whereas love rests on obligation that private interest may break. Hatred, however, is intensified by rapacity because the injured subject sees the ruler not merely as a superior who can punish, but as a continuing threat to the foundations of private life. The warning that people sooner forget the death of a father than the loss of their patrimony gives the condition its sharpest political measure.

Hatred and the Conduct of Rule

The book’s broader theory of political conduct requires a Prince to make his behavior stable in both good and bad fortune. If a ruler changes from leniency to severity only when adversity has already arrived, his severity will seem compelled rather than authoritative, while any late leniency will win no gratitude. Consistency therefore helps prevent the repeated injuries through which hatred grows. Severity that must be used should be decisive and limited, not renewed day after day; the general rule is that injuries should be inflicted at once, while benefits should be distributed gradually.

This principle does not recommend indiscriminate cruelty. It demands a distinction between the harsh measures required to secure a state and the arbitrary practices that convert necessity into personal predation. A Prince governing a newly acquired territory must consider differences in language, laws, and customs, because careless alteration of established conditions can produce resistance. Where a territory shares the conqueror’s language and customs, retaining its laws and taxes while removing the old ruling line helps incorporate it into the hereditary dominion. Where the country differs, residence, carefully placed colonies, and protection of weaker neighbors may prevent disorder from becoming a popular indictment of the new government.

The same logic applies to cities accustomed to freedom. Such communities preserve the memory of their former laws and liberty, and that memory can be turned against a conqueror whenever misfortune weakens him. The ruler has three possible methods: destroy the city, reside there personally, or leave it under its own laws while controlling its government through inhabitants dependent upon his protection. The examples of Pisa, Athens, Thebes, Capua, Carthage, Numantia, and Greece show that institutional memory can outlast long submission. A state that leaves this memory politically intact may discover that hatred and the language of liberty combine in rebellion.

Hatred and Conspiracy

Hatred is most dangerous when foreign affairs are quiet, because the Prince then has to fear secret plots among his own subjects. A conspirator commonly calculates that killing a hated ruler will please the people. If the subjects instead regard the Prince with goodwill, that expectation disappears, and the conspiracy loses the popular shelter on which its success depends. The ruler’s safest defense is therefore not surveillance or punishment alone, but a relationship with the people that makes rebellion politically costly to those who attempt it.

The difficulties facing conspirators are already numerous: distrust among accomplices, jealousy, fear of punishment, and uncertainty about the outcome. A discontented accomplice can remove his own danger by betraying the design, gaining a definite advantage where conspiracy offers only doubtful reward. When the population also detests the intended victim, however, the conspirator risks becoming the enemy of the whole community after the deed. Laws, the majesty of the throne, loyal friends, and governmental protection then reinforce one another; popular goodwill becomes an additional wall around the ruler.

The example of Bologna demonstrates this mechanism. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio was murdered by the Canneschi, leaving only Messer Giovanni, still an infant. The people immediately rose and put the Canneschi to death because the House of the Bentivogli enjoyed general goodwill. When no suitable member of that house remained to govern the city, citizens went to Florence to find a descendant who had been thought to be the son of a smith, brought him back, and entrusted him with the government until Messer Giovanni was old enough to rule. The episode shows that popular attachment can punish a conspiracy and preserve a ruling house even after its principal representative has been killed.

Institutional Safeguards

The book presents well-ordered States as those that prevent both the nobility and the commons from being driven to desperation. The governing problem is not simply to suppress discontent after it appears, but to keep the principal social orders sufficiently satisfied that hatred does not become a shared political interest. The Prince must esteem the great without making himself odious to the people, balancing respect for powerful subjects against protection of the wider community.

France is offered as an institutional example. Its Parliament and the authority attached to it restrain the ambition and arrogance of the nobles while protecting the commons from the fear those nobles inspire. The arrangement also relieves the King from personally bearing every unpopular decision: a third party can act as arbitrator, depress the nobles, and uphold the commons without directly exposing the King to the hatred produced by favoring one side. The lesson is that a Prince should delegate matters that entail responsibility while reserving matters of grace and favor to himself. Institutions can therefore prevent social antagonisms from settling upon the sovereign as personal hatred.

Strategic and Historical Consequences

Hatred also emerges from failures of foresight. The Romans are praised for anticipating political disorders while they were still remote and treating them before they became obvious and incurable. They did not postpone conflict merely to preserve a temporary peace; they fought Philip and Antiochus in Greece rather than allow those powers to become more dangerous in Italy. The argument is that war cannot simply be avoided, only deferred to the advantage of the other side. A ruler who ignores an approaching danger may eventually face not only an external enemy but the hatred of subjects who suffer from the consequences of his delay.

The same reasoning appears in the discussion of alliances. A Prince should not join a stronger power in attacking others unless necessity compels him, because victory may place him at the ally’s mercy. The Venetians’ alliance with France against the Duke of Milan brought about their ruin, while the Florentines had to take a side when the Pope and Spain led their armies against Lombardy. No policy is perfectly safe; prudence consists in distinguishing degrees of disadvantage and accepting the lesser evil. A ruler who makes an apparently convenient choice without considering its future consequences may preserve present calm only by preparing the conditions for later resentment, dependence, and hatred.

Hatred is therefore both a social feeling and a structural diagnosis. It indicates that the Prince has allowed coercion to become predation, that institutions have failed to mediate conflict, or that distant dangers have been left to mature. A ruler may survive fear, severity, or other infamies, but not easily the settled conviction among subjects that his power threatens their property, honor, and political security. Once that conviction becomes general, the people cease to be a shield against conspiracy and may instead become the force that completes the ruler’s overthrow.